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Notes
Blakely and Missouri's Grandparent
Visitation Statute: An Abridgment of
Parents' Constitutional Rights?
Blakely v. Blakely'

I. INTRODUCTION
Universally, states have enacted statutes granting nonparental parties,
specifically grandparents, the right to petition courts for visitation of minor
children.2 However, the states differ significantly in the manner in which they
grant these parties that right. A recent United States Supreme Court decision,
Troxel v. Granville,3 addressed the issue of the constitutionality of nonparental
visitation statutes. Unfortunately, the Court failed to provide much clarity to the
states in deciding constitutional challenges to these statutes.
In Blakely v. Blakely,4 the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the issue and
reached a result inconsistent with the Troxel decision. In so doing, the court
applied an inappropriate standard of review for state statutes interfering with
rights deemed fundamental-parental rights to the care, custody, and control of
children. This Note explores the analysis employed by the court and argues that
Missouri's grandparent visitation statute, as applied in Blakely, is
unconstitutional.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On April 24, 2000, Richard and Carol Blakely ("Grandparents") filed a
petition against Dean and Shelly Blakely ("Parents") under Missouri's
grandparent visitation statute, Missouri Revised Statutes Section 452.402,'
I. Blakely v. Blakely, 83.S.W.3d 537 (Mo. 2002).
2. See infra note 26.

3. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
4. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 538.
5. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 452.402 (2000) provides, in pertinent part:
I. The court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparents of the
child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree. The court may
grant grandparents visitation when:
(3) A grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the child for a period
exceeding ninety days.
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seeking visitation with their four grandchildren.6 The denial of access by Parents
was based, in large part, on their belief that Grandparents were "improper moral
teachers and poor examples," specifically that Grandparents were "divisive,
critical of [the children's mother], bigoted, and liars." 7 Parents were members
of the River of Life Church, while Grandparents attended a church that was
"basically Methodist in philosophy."' Despite efforts to resolve the issue
through counseling and mediation, Parents denied Grandparents visitation for a
year prior to filing the suit.'
In their petition, Grandparents alleged that they were unreasonably denied
visitation with their grandchildren and sought court-imposed visitation pursuant
to Section 452.402."° In response, Parents argued that the statute was
unconstitutional because it violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process
right to raise their children free from unnecessary state interference. " The circuit
court rejected Parents' constitutional objections and found that Parents had
denied visitation for more than ninety days, the denial was unreasonable, and that
it was in the children's best interests that Grandparents be awarded reasonable
visitation. 12 Consequently, the court granted Grandparents two hours of
visitation every ninety days. 3
Parents appealed, arguing that Troxel required courts to find statutes
granting grandparents visitation, in the absence of a finding that lack of visitation

2. The court shall determine if the visitation by the grandparent would be in
the child's best interest or if it would endanger the child's physical health or
impair his emotional development. Visitation may only be ordered when the
court finds such visitation to be in the best interests of the child. The court
may order reasonable conditions or restrictions on grandparent visitation.
After Grandparents filed for petition, Section 452.402 was amended. See Blakely, 83
S.W.3d at 540 n. I. While a court may still grant grandparent visitation if such visitation
has been unreasonably denied for ninety days, the statute no longer permits grandparents
to file for petition under Section 452.402. 1 if the natural parents are legally married to
each other and are living with the child. Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.402.1(4) (Supp. 2002).
Furthermore, Section 452.402.2 has been amended to include a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the parents when they are legally married to each other and are living with the
child. Id. § 452.402.2. These amendments, however, were not considered by the court
in assessing Grandparents' petition. See Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 540 n.l. Though the
amendments might alter a court's evaluation of a grandparent's right to visitation, the
framework for analysis under the statute remains the same as prior, to the amendments.
6. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 538.
7. Id. at 539.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 538.
Ii. Id. at 540.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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will cause the child harm, per se unconstitutional.

4

In rejecting Parents'

contention, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished the instant case from
Troxel and upheld the constitutionality of Section 452.402." In so doing, the
court affirmed the circuit court's judgment granting grandparents limited
visitation, even when the parents are legally married to one another and are
living with the child so long as such visitation is deemed reasonable. 6
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. History of Nonparental Visitation Statutes
The development of nonparental visitation statutes is a relatively recent
phenomenon. 7 The changing realities of American family life spurred state
legislatures to enact statutes granting nonparental parties the right to petition the
courts for visitation of minor children.' 8
Nonparental visitation rights are not firmly established in our judicial
system. 9 The common law provided no protection, even to grandparents
seeking relationships with grandchildren, if the parents of those children opposed
suchrelationships.2 ° Thus, prior to the statutory enactments, a parent was under
no legal obligation to permit a child to visit grandparents and other third
parties.2
As the demographics of family life have shifted over the last thirty years,
however, grandparents and other nonparental figures have played an increasingly
important role in children's lives. Rising rates of divorce, separation, and
remarriage have contributed to a shift away from the traditional nuclear family,
which is clearly no longer the norm.22 The 2000 Census revealed that less than

14. Id. at 543.
15. Id. at 543-45.
16. Id. at 548.
17. The first statutes providing for nonparental visitation were promulgated in the
mid-1960s. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the
Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 337, 371 (2002). However, the concept of grandparent
visitation has been around much longer. See Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151 (La. 1894).
Reiss is the earliest reported case addressing the issue of grandparent visitation. The
court held that grandparent visitation was a moral, not legal, obligation. Id. at 152.
18. See Edward M. Bums, GrandparentVisitation Rights: Is It Time for the
Pendulum to Fall?, 25 FAM. L.Q. 59, 59-60 (1991).
19. See 3 CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 16.12, at 2

(2003).
20. See Dolgin, supra note 17, at 371.
21. See Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991); Leake v.
Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Okla. 1980).
22. See M. Kristine Taylor Warren, GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS: A LEGAL
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twenty-five percent of U.S. households are comprised of married couples and
their children.23 The result is a shift toward a "blended" family, where children
may be raised by nonparental figures.24
In response to the changing demographics of American family life, state
legislators began to promulgate nonparental visitation statutes.25 Grandparental
lobbying groups, such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP),
played a significant role in convincing legislators to enact these statutes.26 As a
result, every state now has some form of nonparental visitation statute.27
B. Substantive Due Process and ParentalRights
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."28 In addition to the procedural guarantee of due process, the clause
includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. 29
For a right to receive such heightened protection, it must be "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty," so that "neither liberty norjustice would exist if they were sacrificed."3
The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is
one of the oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by the United States
Supreme Court.3 In Meyer v. Nebraska,32 the Court stated that liberty, protected
by the Due Process Clause, includes the right "to marry, establish a home and

RESEARCH GUIDE, at xiii-xiv (2001).

23. See Whatever Happened to the Nuclear Family?: 2000 Census Report on
Families, 16 FOOD PROCESSING 10 (Aug. 1, 2001), available at LEXIS, News Library,
All News Group File.
24. See Steven H. Hobbs, We Are Family: Changing Times, ChangingIdeologies
and Changing Laws, 14 CAP. U. L. REv. 511, 512 (1985).
25. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64-65 (2000).
26. See Catherine Bostock, Does the Expansion ofGrandparentVisitation Rights
Promote the Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of GrandparentVisitation Laws in
the Fifty States, 27 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 319, 325 (1994); Bums, supra note 18,
at 59-60.
27. See David L. Walther, Survey of Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 11 AM. J.
FAM. 95, 104 (1997).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); see also Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
30. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326
(1993)).
31. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
32. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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bring up children... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."33 In
Meyer, a Nebraska school teacher was convicted of violating a state statute that
prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students who had not yet
completed the eighth grade.34
The Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional as a violation of due process and preserved the right of parents
to instruct their children in a foreign language.35
A short time after Meyer, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of parents
to control their children's education. In Pierce v. Society ofSisters of the Holy
Names ofJesus andMary,36 an organization running Catholic schools challenged
the constitutionality of an Oregon statute requiring every child between the ages
of eight and sixteen to attend a public school.37 The Court found that the statute
"unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control."38 Consequently, the
Court held that the statute violated the parents' constitutional right to choose
where their children would be educated.39
Almost twenty years later, in Princev. Massachusetts, the Court returned
to the subject of parental rights in directing the upbringing of children.4 The
Court stated: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."42
These principles were reaffirmed thirty years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 3
In Yoder, Amish parents were charged with violating Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance law, requiring children to attend school until the age of
sixteen." In finding for the parents, the Court stated that the "history and culture

33. Id. at 399.
34. Id. at 396-97.
35. Id. at 403.
36. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
37. Id. at 530.
38. Id. at 534-35.
39. Id. at 535.
40. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
41. In Prince,the United States Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts labor law
statute. Id. at 170. Sarah Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, was the legal custodian of Betty
Simmons, her niece. Id. at 159. Both distributed pamphlets on public streets. Id. at 16162. Sarah was accused of using Betty for child labor. Id. at 159. While noting the
constitutionally protected province of parents in nurturing and caring for their children,
the court held that the distribution of pamphlets did not fall within the scope of private
parental rights. Id. at 168.
42. Id. at 166.
43. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. Id. at 207-09.
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of Western civilization reflects a strong tradition of parental concern for the
nurture and upbringing of their children."4 The Court concluded, "This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
46
debate as an enduring American tradition.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases continue to recognize the fundamental
nature of a parent's right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and
control of his or her children.47 Most recently, and most applicable to this Note,
is the Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville.48 Troxel, like Blakely, is a case
where a parent's right to determine who may visit her children was infringed
upon by the application of a state statute permitting third parties to apply for
visitation of minor children.49 In Troxel, the grandparents sought visitation with
their two granddaughters, born to their son out of wedlock."0 The Washington
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional and denied the grandparents
visitation of their grandchildren." The grandparents appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 2 The Supreme Court held that
the Washington statute, as applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 3 In so holding, the Court recognized a parent's fundamental

45. Id. at 232.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (discussing the
"long line of cases" that recognize the constitutionally protected right of parents to
"direct the education and upbringing of one's children"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982) (discussing "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602 (1979)
(noting that "[o]ur jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children"); Quilloin v.
Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978) (reaffirming the constitutionally protected relationship
between parents and their children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating
that "the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his
or her children 'come(s) to this Court with a momentum of respect"') (quoting Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)).
48. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
49. Id. at 67. Washington Revised Code Annotated Section 26.10.160(3) (West
1997), the pertinent statute, read as follows: "Any person may petition the court for
visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court
may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of
the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances." The Washington
statute now states that the United State Supreme Court found Section 26.10.160(3)
unconstitutional in the Troxel case. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 26.10.160 (West Supp.
2003).
50. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
51. Id. at 63.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
children.54 The Court, however, was cautious not to hold specific nonparental
visitation statutes per se unconstitutional.55 The Court reasoned that
Washington's statute was "breathtakingly broad" and failed to accord "special
weight" to the decisions of parents.56 The Supreme Court's decision in Troxel
resulted in a reexamination by many state courts of the constitutionality of
nonparental visitation statutes, including the Missouri Supreme Court in Blakely.
C. Missouri's GrandparentVisitation Statute
Early common law recognized no legal right of grandparents or other third
parties to visitation with minor children. 7 Courts and legislatures adopted laws
consistent with protecting the autonomy of parents in decisions regarding the
care, custody, and upbringing of their children.58 Missouri case law supporting
the common law approach is found as early as 1930,59 and was further solidified
in the 1953 case Wilson v. Wilson, 0 where the Eastern District of the Missouri
Court of Appeals stated that "[a] parent's claim to custody, absent unfitness,
6
must prevail over the claims of grandparents." '
In 1977, the Missouri legislature supplanted the common law approach of
parental autonomy with the enactment of Section 452.402, which provided
grandparents a claim to visitation of their grandchildren. 62 The legislature
intended to provide an "expeditious procedure for grandparents to petition the
court to determine reasonable visitation rights. ,6 3 The original version of
Missouri's grandparent visitation statute allowed visitation only upon the death
of the grandparent's child. 6' In 1988, the legislature amended the statute, adding
Subsection 1(4), to include claims to visitation in circumstances where an intact
family unit denied such visitation to grandparents.65

54. Id. at 66.
55. Id. at 73-74.
56. Id. at 67, 69.
57. See Dolgin, supra note 17, at 371.
58. See Robert C. Paden, Jr., Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Parents v.
Guardians,52 J. Mo. B. 156, 156 (1996).
59. See Abel v. Ingram, 24 S.W.2d 1048, 1050 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930).
60. 260 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
61. Id. at 776.
62. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (1978) (superceded).
63. In re A.F. v. B.F.O., 760 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
64. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.402 (1978) (superceded).
65. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402.1(4) (2000). Subsection 1(4) provides that a court
may grant grandparent visitation when: "[a] grandparent is unreasonably denied
visitation with the child for a period exceeding ninety days."

Mo. REv. STAT.

§

452.402.1(4) (2000).
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In 1993, the constitutionality of Section 452.402 was challenged in
Herndon v. Tuhey.66 In Herndon, the grandparents brought an action, under

Section 452.402, against the parents seeking visitation rights with the children.67
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized the fundamental right of parents to raise
their children as they see fit, but noted that the magnitude of the infringement by
a state is a significant consideration in determining whether a statute
unconstitutionally interferes with that right.68 The court found that Section
452.402 contemplated only "occasional, temporary visitation, which may only
be allowed if a trial court finds visitation to be in the best interest of the child and
does not endanger the child's physical or emotional development."69 Moreover,
the court noted that grandparents are members of the extended family and, as
such, play an important role in the raising of the children.7" The court, therefore,
upheld Section 452.402."' Blakely acted to confirm the Herndon holding in light
of the United States Supreme Court's subsequent Troxel decision.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Blakely, the Missouri Supreme Court held that Section 452.402 was
constitutional and, as applied, did not unnecessarily interfere with parental
rights.72 The court began by acknowledging that its earlier opinion in Herndon
v. Tuhey73 upheld Section 452.402 and approved an order similar to that issued
in the instant case.74 Borrowing from Herndon'sanalysis, the court stated that

Section 452.402 contemplates "occasional, temporary visitation, which may only
be allowed if a trial court finds visitation to be in the best interest of the child and
does not endanger the child's physical or emotional development."75 The court
then distinguished such minimal intrusion from those infringements that have
been held to be substantial and thus unconstitutional.76

66. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
67. Id. at 204.
68. Id. at 208.
69. Id. at 209.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 208.
72. Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Mo. 2002).
73. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d 203.
74. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 541.
75. Id. at 543-44 (quoting Herndon, 875 S.W.2d at 209).
76. Id. at 541. Parents relied on a number of cases where state interference with
parental rights was held unconstitutional, including Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982), Princev. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names ofJesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 541. The
court distinguished each of those cases as constituting substantial infringements on
parental rights. Id.
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Next, the court discussed the effect of the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Troxel on the reasoning of Herndon and subsequent Missouri
decisions." The court first noted that the Troxel decision did not act to
invalidate all grandparent- visitation statutes; rather, it simply held the
Washington statute unconstitutional as applied."8 Then, the court distinguished
Section 452.402 from the invalidated statute in Troxel on a number of grounds.79
Because the Missouri statute permits only grandparentsto petition for forced
visitation, while the Washington statute allowed any person to petition for
visitation, the court stated that Section 452.402 "avoids the sweeping breadth"
of the statute criticized by the Troxel Court. 0 The court made a further
distinction between the statutes. To have standing under Section 452.402, a
grandparent must have been denied full visitation for a period of ninety days
prior to filing for petition." In contrast, the Washington statute gave automatic
standing-that is, no minimal period for denial of visitation-to parties seeking
visitation.12 The court noted the importance of this distinction in limiting the
breadth of the visitation statute and alleviating the Troxel Court's concerns. 3
Additionally, the court found that Section 452.402, unlike the Washington
' This was a key
statute, required the denial of visitation to be "unreasonable." 84
distinction in the mind of the court, because the requirement of
"unreasonableness" placed the burden of proof on the grandparents." Thus, the
court found that the Missouri statute afforded the decision of the parents a
"rebuttable presumption of validity."86 Consequently; the court felt that the
statute recognized a parent's fundamental right to make decisions relating to the
care and custody of a child. 7
Finally, the court made the distinction that the Missouri statute provided
procedural safeguards that assist the court in determining whether a parent's
decision as to visitation is unreasonable. 8 These safeguards include home study,
consultation with the child, and appointment of a guardian ad litem if

77. Id. at 542.

78. Id. at 543.
79. Id. at 544.
80. Id.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 545.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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necessary. 9 The court believed that these safeguards avoid a decision based
solely on the discretion of the trial judge in lieu of parental decisions.9"
Next, the court determined the appropriate standard of review to apply to
visitation statutes. The court noted that the plurality in Troxel did not articulate
the specific standard to apply to such statutes; rather, the Troxel Court left that
determination to a case-by-case analysis.9 Given this opportunity, the Missouri
Supreme Court specifically rejected the application of strict scrutiny in reviewing
the validity of visitation statutes.92 However, the court failed to clearly articulate
the standard of review it applied in determining the constitutionality of Section
452.402. Although the court recognized that parental rights are "of prime
importance," it balanced those rights against the best interests of the child and
the state's interests in maintaining contact between grandparents and
grandchildren and in encouraging families to resolve disputes without a great
amount of governmental interference.93 In so doing, the court held that the

state's interest in preserving the grandparent-grandchild relationship outweighed
the parents' right to make decisions regarding Visitation.94 Therefore, the court
held Section 452.402 constitutional.9"
V. COMMENT

In Blakely, the Missouri Supreme Court extended the holding of its earlier
decision in Herndon into the post-Troxel era. In so doing, the court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 452.402 and affirmed the grandparent visitation order
imposed by the trial court.96 Although the court made it apparent that strict
scrutiny was not the appropriate standard of review to apply to the facts before
it," the court failed to clearly articulate the standard it utilized in determining the
constitutionality of Missouri's grandparent visitation statute. Rather, the court
favored a case-by-case approach that could potentially yield inconsistent
applications of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause among
individuals challenging the constitutionality of Section 452.402. 9'
Despite recognizing the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
regarding the care, custody, and upbringing of their children, the court failed to

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 546.

92. Id. at 547.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

546.
538.
547.
546.
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apply the standard of review appropriate for such fundamental rights (i.e., strict
scrutiny).99 The court avoided application of the strict scrutiny standard, relying
heavily on Herndon, by finding that the state's intrusion into the fundamental
liberty did not "infringe substantially" or "heavily burden" family autonomy.' 0
The magnitude of the infringement has been recognized as a consideration in
fundamental rightsjurisprudence.)' However, allowing the government to force
third party visitation upon an unwilling family, even when that third party is a
grandparent, constitutes a significant intrusion into the integral family unit
sufficient to warrant strict scrutiny analysis.0 2 In fact, most courts have applied
strict scrutiny analysis in determining the constitutionality of nonparental
visitation statutes. 03 The application of strict scrutiny would afford the right of
parents to make decisions regarding the care of their children the fundamental

99. See id. at 547; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (noting that the plurality failed to articulate the appropriate standard of
review but stating that he would apply strict scrutiny analysis); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857
S.W.2d 203, 211 (Mo. 1993) (Covington, J., dissenting) ("Traditionally, governmental
intrusions on a fundamental liberty interest have been reviewed with strict scrutiny to
determine whether the governmental intrusion is constitutional.") (citing Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-502 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1964)).
100. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 542 (quoting Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 208-09).
101. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at
208.
102. See Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 212 (Covington, J., dissenting). If the impact of
the state regulation does not rise to the level of substantial infringement, the applicable
level of scrutiny is rational basis. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 462 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
103. See, e.g., L.B.S. v. L.M.S., 826 So. 2d 178, 184 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (stating
that "[b]ecause the determination of child-visitation rights directly interferes with the
parents' fundamental right to rear their children, a strict-scrutiny analysis must be
applied"); Linder v. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841, 855 (Ark. 2002) (applying strict scrutiny to
grandparent visitation statute, in accordance with most courts addressing the issue); In
re Custody of C.M., No. 00CA2313, 2002 WL 31116773, at *2 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 12,
2002) (concluding that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review for grandparent
visitation statute); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 441 (Conn. 2002) (stating that any
infringement on a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control over his or her child
requires application of the strict scrutiny test); Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 317
(Iowa 200 1) (applying strict scrutiny test to visitation statute); Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d
1052, 1062 (Mass. 2002) (stating that the grandparent visitation statute requires strict
scrutiny analysis because it implicates fundamental parental rights); Stacy v. Ross, 798
So. 2d 1275, 1280 (Miss. 2001) (stating that "[i]nterference with [the right of a parent to
determine visitation] based upon anything less than compelling circumstances is not the
intent of the visitation statute").
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protection it deserves. 04
' Under strict scrutiny review, Section 452.402 is highly
suspect because wherefit parents assert their fundamental right to the care and
upbringing of their children, the state's interest is "de minimis."' 5
In lieu of the strict scrutiny test, the court in Blakely balanced the parental
rights against the best interest of the child and the state's interest in maintaining
contact between grandparents and grandchildren and found the scales to tip in
favor of the state. 1 6 Exactly where this test falls along the spectrum of statutory
judicial review is somewhat unclear. It appears that the court employed a
rational basis test in determining the constitutionality of Section 452.402,
asserting that the statute sought to "'ensure the welfare of children therein by
protecting the relationships those children form with such third parties' and
provide children with the 'opportunity to benefit from relationships with
statutorily specified persons--for example, their grandparents.""0 7 Although the
United States Supreme Court, in Troxel, did not clearly articulate the standard
of review to apply in determining the constitutionality of nonparental visitation
statutes, it is relatively clear that the Court used something more rigorous than
the rational basis test.0 8 Applying, at the very least, a heightened standard of
review as suggested in Troxel would require more than a rational relationship
between the state statute and the objective of that statute. Rather, Section
452.402 intrudes upon the parents' fundamental liberty interest in family
autonomy and does so in a broad fashion, providing only a "best interest of the
child" test.0 9 Consequently, the means are not narrowly drawn to the
statute's ends." 0
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the balancing test employed by the
Blakely court encourages inconsistent and unpredictable applications of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause among individuals challenging the

104. See Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 212 (Covington, J., dissenting).
105. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d
at 211 (Covington, J.,
dissenting); Bryan Thomas White, Note, Muddling Through the
Murky Waters ofTroxel: Will GrandparentVisitation Statutes Sink or Swim?, 39 FAM.
& CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 104, 108 (2001) (stating that "grandparent/third-party

visitation statutes would be rendered unconstitutional because it is highly unlikely that
these statues serve a compelling state interest").
106. Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 545 (Mo. 2002).
107. Id. at 546 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000)).

108. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Holly M. Davis, Note, Non-Parent Visitation
Statutes: Was Troxel v. Granville Their Death-Knell?, 23 WHITIER L. REv. 721, 753

(2002) (suggesting that using the rational basis test might contradict the plurality opinion
in Troxel); White, supra note 105, at 108 (stating that the Troxel plurality employed a
heightened protection standard of review to parental decisions opposing grandparent

visitation petitions).
109. See Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 212 (Covington, J., dissenting).
110. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss3/4

12

Hamlin: Hamlin: Blakely and Missouri's Grandparent Visitation Statute:
2003]

GRANDPARENT VISITATION

constitutionality of Section 452.402."' Rather than adopting a standard of
review consistent with the fundamental right asserted, the court adopted a caseby-case approach for determining the propriety of Missouri's grandparent
visitation statute-that is, each court must balance the applicable interests to
determine if the court-ordered visitation amounts to a substantial interference of
a parent's right to care, custody, and control of his or her children." 2 This
standard, in essence, allows an individual trial judge's discretion to determine the
amount of infringement permissible under the Constitution." 3 Furthermore, it
encourages an arbitrary application of the law and pernits a scenario where
various courts reach differing opinions as to the constitutionality of similar
visitation orders."' The court's standard directly contradicts the long-standing
principle that the Constitution must be applied as uniformly as possible without
resulting in a vast number of differing constitutional interpretations among
jurisdictions."'
Additionally, the Blakely court's holding failed to acknowledge that Section
452.402 does not afford "special weight" to a fit parent's decision regarding the
care, custody, and control of his or her child-a primary concern of the Supreme
Court in Troxel. Instead, the court suggests that the "unreasonably denied"
language in the statute employs such a presumption." 6 However, the legislative
history of Section 452.402 suggests that the "unreasonably denied" Subsection
was added to broaden the scope of the statute to include visitation between an
intact family and estranged grandparents. 7 Contrary to the court's assertion, the
statute, on its face, does not require a court to lend special weight to the parent's
determination." 8 Absent a finding of unfitness, such a presumption in favor of
the parents must be employed. "9 Interestingly, the court made no such assertion,
much less a finding, that the parents were not fit to raise their children.

I 11. Id.; see also Natania M. Soto, Note, Family Law: Whose Kids Are They,
Anyway?: Analyzing Troxel v. Granville and the Current State of Oklahoma's
GrandparentVisitation Statute, 54 OKLA. L. REv. 413, 427 (2001).
112. See Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 546; see also Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210-11
(stating that "[o]ur interpretation is based in part on the fact that if the statute allowed a
great amount of visitation we would be more likely to find an undue burden on the family
and hold that [Section 452.402 is] unconstitutional").
113. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 211.
114. Id.; see also Mark Moody, Note, Constitutional Questions Regarding
Grandparent Visitation and Due ProcessStandards, 60 Mo. L. REv. 195, 215 (1995).
115. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347-48 (1 Wheat. 1816).
116. See Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 545.
117. See Brief for Respondent at 26, Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo.
1993) (No. 17897-2) (citing Missouri House of Representative Interim Committee on
Children, Youth, and Families, Report to the Speaker on Child Custody, Visitation, Child
Support Enforcement and Divorce Mediation 22 (1987)).
118. Perhaps this explains the Missouri legislature's recent amendment to Section
452.402 to include such a presumption. See supra note 5.
119. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000).
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The court found significant the fact that the statute includes procedural
safeguards, such as providing a home study, consulting with the child, and
appointment of a guardian ad litem.'20 Though these safeguards may assist the
judge in determining visitation rights, they are a far cry from ensuring that
special weight is given to parental decisions. Consequently, Section 452.402
does not clearly afford a presumption in favor of fit parents regarding
nonparental visitation and, as a result, is unconstitutional.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Blakely v. Blakely, the Missouri Supreme Court held Missouri's
grandparent visitation statute constitutional. While properly acknowledging the
fundamental right ofparents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
upbringing of their children, the court applied an inappropriate standard of
review and, consequently, reached a result that encourages inconsistent and
unpredictable application of the law.
MICHAEL HAMLIN

120. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d at 545.
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